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Abstract
Maintaining regional peace and security is a major concern for the Association of South East Asian 
Nations(ASEAN) while preserving strong and strategic ties with China is also imperative for the 
protection of regional economic and security interests . In a territorial dispute that involves most 
ASEAN nations to a different extent, delicately crafting a diplomatic solution to protect good working 
relations among ASEAN nations and China will become increasingly difficulty. China has been 
accused of intimidating and using other coercive tactics against the Philippines and Vietnam in its bid 
to claim large areas of the South China Sea against the interests of ASEAN member states . Despite 
these tensions, ASEAN, nor its member nations have “condemned‟ these actions, or sort to sanction 
the Chinese at the risk of damaging lucrative economic relations to the detriment of security and 
stability in the region . A lack of solidarity within the ASEAN community has the capacity to undermine 
its function and response which has thus far been limited in addressing this issue . This paper will 
discuss aspects of Philippine, Vietnamese and Indonesian government policy towards China and 
characterize ASEAN‟s role in resolving and managing the conflict. The Philippines and Vietnam have 
increasingly troubled and deteriorating relations with the Chinese, in contrast with the Indonesians, 
who are working expeditiously to strengthen ties with the Chinese across a plethora of foreign policy 
and defense cooperation issues. The prospect of a unified ASEAN response to the South China 
Sea territorial dispute remains unlikely. Indonesia‟s proposed code of conduct may be the first step 
in addressing peace and security, however is not a long term solution and governments throughout 
the region must continue ongoing robust diplomatic efforts through ASEAN, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, with international assistance and cooperation, to resolve these territorial disputes .
Keywords: South China Sea, ASEAN, International Relations, Regional Security 
and Stability, Regional Cooperation
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Asian region in economic, military, political and 
social power has triggered a rise in tensions in the region as interests 
between these immerging powers overlap and exert pressure upon one 
other. Never before has the world witnessed the expeditious growth of 
powers within such a close proximity and with so many mutual over-
lapping national interests. During the Cold War era, the power base 
of the United States and the Soviet Union were located far from each 
1 Author obtained his Masters Degree  in  Politics and International Relations from 
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 
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other and the two entities had almost no agreements for cooperation, 
economic development or other overlapping interests. This reflects a 
very different reality to the ongoing territorial disputes of the South 
China Sea. China is an immerging power of approximately 1.3 billion 
inhabitants, while the Association of South East Asian Nations com-
prises of 10 nations with a population of over 600 million people, and 
the potential to exceed America in terms of trade volume, economic de-
mand and strength. China has refused to deal with ASEAN as a block 
of nations or enter a process of international arbitration, instead 
demanding  that  China  deal  individually  and  directly  with  each  na-
tion  involved  in  the territorial disputes. Many ASEAN nations have 
refused to deal directly with Beijing and wish to use the Association 
of South East Asian Nations as a union in which to negotiate with the 
Chinese.
This paper will firstly discuss the dynamics of ASEAN as an asso-
ciation of nations within the South East  Asian  region,  followed  by  a 
discussion  of  the  South  China  Sea  territorial  dispute  making partic-
ular note of the fragile Vietnam-China and Philippine-China relations, 
two relations that have suffered severely as a result of these territorial 
dispute, as well as the Indonesian response to the disputes as a nation 
developing further cooperation with China. Through this lens, this 
paper outline the role of ASEAN in this disputes resolution process and 
assess the possibility of a joint, united and decisive ASEAN response 
to the South China Sea disputes and the capacity of this association to 
resolve the issue.
II. THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
(ASEAN)
ASEAN was established on the 8 th August 1967 in Bangkok, 
Thailand in the form of the ASEAN Declaration. According to the 
aims and purpose of ASEAN, the association will accelerate economic 
growth and progress, promote regional peace and security through re-
spect and justice, and promote collaboration and assistance while main-
taining close and beneficial cooperation2. These ASEAN functions are 
2  ASEAN Secretariat. “Overview. Aims and Purpose,” Association of South East 
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discharged within the Political-Security Community (APSC), a body 
mandated with ensuring countries in the region live in peace with one 
another with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environ-
ment3. This body is also responsible to “promote the development 
of norms that enhance ASEAN defense and security cooperation”4. 
The Philippine Government has noted that ASEAN is committed to 
establishing a politically cohesive, economically integrated, socially re-
sponsible, people-oriented, and people-centered Community by 20155 
which will strengthen economic, social and political cooperation be-
tween ASEAN member states and develop its role and importance in 
regional and international political and defense matters. ASEAN is a re-
gional organizations which supports “the pursuit of international peace, 
security and stability. With the wisdom that neighbors are in the best 
position to know one another, the regional organization has become the 
pre-eminent platform for dialogue and engagement”6 Foreign Minister 
Del Rosario of the Philippines further notes “ASEAN contributed to the 
progressive development of international norms that are recognized in 
the region – the non-use of force or threat of force, the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, the primacy of international law, consensus, and non-
interference‟7. Based upon the aims of ASEAN, it’s inevitable that this 
association will be required to play a central role in dealing with the 
South China Sea disputes, which has heightened tensions and created 
an atmosphere of distrust in the region.
ASEAN was formed “to give smaller South East Asian nations a 
louder voice to counter the influence of larger nations” 8. ASEAN how-
Asian Nations, Available at: <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean>.
3  ASEAN Political-Security Community.
4 ASEAN Political Security Community, ASEAN Political Security Community Blue-
print. B.1.5. 2009. Available at <http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf>.
5  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Secretary Del Rosario 
Highlights ASEAN, Philippines‟ Contributions to Regional Peace, Security and Sta-
bility at NDCP Founding Anniversary Lecture 19 August 2014. Available from: http://
www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/dfa-releases/3856-secretary-del-
rosario-highlights-asean-philippines-contributions-to-regional-peace-security-and-
stability-at-ndcp-founding-anniversary-lecture
6  Del Rosario, Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Republic of the Philippines. Ibid.
7  Ibid .
8  Al-Jazeera. ASEAN summit ends with walk-out by the Philippines’ Foreign Minister, 
13 July 2012, Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zm9MRfQo7O0>.
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ever maintains the strong stance that nations do not have the right to 
toil within the domestic affairs of neighboring nations and the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of nations will be upheld. This was seen 
as a positive step during the formulation of the association, however 
has fractured ASEAN cooperation in dealing with the South China Sea 
disputes and intern impacting the peace dynamics in the region. A du-
rable peace is a situation where interparty relations have reached a high 
level of cooperation and reciprocity, and war is unthinkable. With stable 
peace, relations have transcended the stage where war does not happen 
and moved into a situation where war is perceived as something that 
will not happen, at least in people’s minds9, however this no longer 
reflects the situation in the South China Sea.
III. CRACKS APPEARING WITH ASEAN COOPERATION
The policy of conflict resolution via cooperation has not gone as 
smoothly as possible and nations have been diplomatically provoca-
tive in dealing with this issue. International powers exert their influ-
ence on the region through ASEAN and its institutions, compromising 
its capacity to resolve this issue. ASEAN could be considered in an “un-
stable peace‟. An unstable peace occurs under the circumstances where:
“Tensions and suspicions between the parties are so high that peace no 
longer seems guaranteed and the parties perceive each other as enemies . 
Tensions and suspicion run high, however violence is either absent or only 
sporadic”10 .
ASEAN and China have been largely successful in maintaining 
peace and security in the region despite a number of close military 
encounters however this peace is becoming increasingly fragile. Al-
Jazeera reported on the 13th July 2012, the Philippine Foreign Minister 
walked out of an ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh over a dispute regard-
ing the Scarborough Shoal, islands off the coast of The Philippines that 
are recognized and claimed by China and Taiwan.
9  Weissmann, M. The South China Sea conflict and Sino-ASEAN relations: A study in 
conflict prevention and peace building. 2010. Asian Perspectives. Pro Quest.
10  Weissmann, M. The South China Sea conflict and Sino-ASEAN relations: A study 
in conflict prevention and peace building. 2010. Asian Perspectives. Pro Quest.
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According to The Philippines Foreign Minister, he ‘had simply 
asked for the communique to include the fact that the Scarborough 
Shoal issue was talked about at the summit, nothing more’. Despite 
having the support of most ASEAN nations, Cambodia, the host na-
tion of the summit and a strong Chinese ally had simply refused to 
include this issue in the dialogue. Upon the departure of the Philippine 
Foreign Minister from Phnom Penh, he accused the Chinese of us-
ing pressure and tactics as well as intimidation on smaller nations to 
denigrate the Philippine’s sovereignty‟. The Chinese reacted strongly 
to The Philippines telling them “not to cause trouble‟, and face the facts 
that the Scarborough  Shoal  is  not  a  disputed  territory  and  belongs 
whole  heartedly  to  China‟.  This undiplomatic language illustrates the 
tensions among nations regarding the issue. Cambodia’s stance could 
be considered in defiance of Section B.1.4. of the ASEAN Political-
Security Community Blueprint which endeavors to “Strengthen efforts 
in maintaining respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of 
ASEAN Member States as stipulated in the Declaration on the Prin-
ciples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations‟11. The actions of the Cambodian Government have inhibited 
the opportunity of the Philippine Government to present its sovereignty 
dispute case to the ASEAN Community which has undermined the ca-
pacity of the association to deal with this issue. In section B.2. of the 
blueprint, it states that;
“The settlement of differences or disputes should be regulated by rational, 
effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes, 
which might endanger or hinder cooperation, which seeks to preserve 
regional peace and harmony and prescribes that Member States refrain 
from threat or use of force . Section B .2 .3 . states that ASEAN must promote 
regional cooperation to maintain peace and stability.‟12
Administratively, ASEAN is highly and fatally vulnerable to the 
influences of powerful regional actors, especially the Chinese with 
11  ASEAN Political-Security Community. ASEAN Political-Security Community 
Blueprint, 2009. Available at: http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf
12  ASEAN Political-Security Community. ASEAN Political-Security Community 
Blueprint, Conflict Resolution and Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 2009. Available at: 
http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf
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regards to this issue. This has the potential to undermine cooperation 
among ASEAN member states and stall the process of conflict media-
tion and resolution regarding this issue. Article 47 (2) of the ASEAN 
Charter states that ‘this charter will be implemented with the agreement 
of each ASEAN member in accordance with their internal procedures’. 
As a consequence of this, upon the occasions that one ASEAN state re-
fuses to codify or recognize a given document, the proposed document 
in question shall be rendered as void. Voting is not done on a consen-
sus and a negative vote by one single ASEAN member will block the 
decision. It virtually provides veto rights to each ASEAN member and 
foreign powers that have the capacity to influence ASEAN members 
such as China and the United States which are becoming increasingly 
engaged in this region.
In addition to this, ASEAN nations have expeditiously developed 
their military capabilities through increased defense budgets. Military 
analysts at IHS Jane’s Defense Analysis say that South-East Asian 
countries together increased defense spending by 13.5% last year, to 
$24.5 billion. The figure is projected to rise to $40 billion by 2016‟13. 
According to the article, Indonesian defense spending increased by 
84% between 2005 and 2009, possibly as a result of the South China 
Sea tensions. Rapid economic growth has been mentioned as one con-
tributing factor to this military expansion.
According to the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN is required to protect 
and increase peace, security and stability and further strengthen values 
that are orientated towards regional peace.  The association is also re-
quired to advance wider political, security, economic and social coop-
eration between ASEAN members and a number of their regional part-
ners. The ASEAN + 3 is an important forum in which ASEAN engages 
with the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. 
The latest ASEAN + 3 dialogue was held in May 201414, however is-
sues regarding the South China Sea disputes were not addressed and no 
statement was released clarifying policies adopted by ASEAN in order 
to deal with these disputes. Transnational crime was discussed in much 
13  The Economist. Countries are buying lots of weapons, but does it count as an arms 
race? 24 May 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/21551056
14  Association of South East Asian Nation. ASEAN + 3 Dialogue. 2014. Available at: 
http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation-2
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more depth, however is a less prominent political issues in the region. 
This may be considered a deliberate attempt by ASEAN or China to 
ignore and avoid the issue in international forums.
IV. SOUTH CHINA SEA
Territorial claims and issues of sovereignty have been diplomatic 
irritants and triggers of conflict in the South China Sea for decades. 
China’s first policy to claim large regions of the South China Sea were 
released by the Interior Ministry of the Chinese Government in 1947. 
This was a policy of nine dashes on a map representing the areas 
claimed by the Chinese Government ‘that appears to enclose an area 
covering roughly 90% of the South China Sea’15.
China claims some of these regions based upon “historical events‟ 
and archeological findings and evidence. Claims of sovereignty over al-
15  O‟Rourke, R. Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Dispute 
Involving China: Issue For Congress. Congressional Research Service. September 26, 
2014.
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most the entire maritime area of the South China Sea have seriously up-
set the strategic equilibrium of the region and nations have worked vig-
orously to maintain their sovereignty. These maps and claims are highly 
ambiguous, there are many different versions of the map and there is no 
map provided by the Chinese Government of exactly which waters and 
islands are claimed. A ten-dash map was also released, claiming Taiwan 
within Chinese territory, as well as provocative moves by the Chinese 
Government depicting disputed regions as Chinese territory in the Chi-
nese passport. Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam all lodged dip-
lomatic complaints with the Chinese Embassy in the respected nation.
Some observers ‘characterize China’s approach for asserting and 
defending its territorial claims in the South China Sea as a “salami-
slicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of 
which by itself is a casus belli (action to provoke war), to gradually 
change the status quo in China’s favor16. Despite the ambiguities of the 
claims, nations in the region have attempted to deal with this issue and 
maintain peace and security through a number of international legal 
mechanisms. “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), article three states “every State has the right to establish 
the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with 
this Convention‟17.This convention was implemented in 1994 and was 
aimed at establishing a series of legal measures on the economic rights 
of nations based on their territorial waters and continental baselines. 
Nations are also entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 
nautical mile that extends from the baseline of the coastal nation‟18. 
Under Article 56 of the given convention, nations possess sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and man-
aging their natural resources, whether living or non- living, of the wa-
ters superjacent to the seabed, of the seabed and its subsoil, and with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents 
16  Ibid .
17  United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
18  South China Sea: Conflicting Claims and Tensions. Lowy Institute for International 
Policy. 2013.  Retrieved from.<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/south-china-sea>.
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and winds19. Other nations do not have the right to conduct activities 
within another state’s waters without their consent and this will have 
economic implication on the region if these disputes areas cannot be 
resolved. Considering the economic potential of this region, nations are 
working vigorously to protect their economic interests.
V. ASEAN’S ROLE IN THE REGION
Although ASEAN has not reacted to the South China Sea dis-
putes in the same manner as the European Union and Americans 
have reacted to ongoing Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, ASEAN 
has played an important role in ensuring dialogue, the expansion of re-
gional overlapping interests and the development of trust and coopera-
tion between parties which has been imperative in preventing physical 
conflict. Significant sectors of the foreign policy establishment claim 
that “war is considered most unlikely as the South China Sea conflict 
cannot be separated from the overarching Sino-ASEAN relations‟20. 
“Clinton articulated what she believed was the consensus among most 
of the world’s maritime powers and proposed that ASEAN serve as a 
multilateral venue for South China Sea negotiations – a prospect sup-
ported by four ASEAN claimants (Malaysia, The Philippines, Viet-
nam, and Brunei), but vigorously opposed by China”21, which wishes 
to use its dominance over these nations and the region to push its own 
interests. Nations in the South China Sea rely heavily upon each other 
and have significant interests in the protection of rights such as freedom 
of navigation and economic trade. Some of the world most impor-
tant trade routes move through the South China Sea, trade routes that 
China heavily relies on as an exporting nation. It is not within China’s 
interests for these routes to be disrupted through conflict or heightened 
tensions.
19  United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 56.
20  Weissmann, “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study 
in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building,” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol . 34 (3), 
(2010), pp. 35-69.
21  Simon, S. US-Southeast Asia Relations: Deep in South China Sea Diplomacy. 
2011. Comparative Connections, East Asian Bilateral Relations. Arizona State Uni-
versity: Arizona.
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The South China Sea conflict is linked with the overall peace-
building process between China and ASEAN that has taken place 
over the past two decades. Efforts to develop mutually beneficial trust 
and ongoing dialogue have been important and play a pivotal role 
in achieving South East Asian peace. ASEAN has been praised for 
its capacity to maintain peace among nations despite the lack of any 
formal organization for security and military cooperation in the South 
East Asian and North Asian regions. ASEAN applies diplomacy in both 
a formal and informal manner and utilizes soft diplomacy as opposed 
to belligerence and threats of conflict.
ASEAN is working to counter the threat of warfare on the basis 
of territorial disputes through the expeditious development of strong 
and interdependent ties between ASEAN and its “plus three” external 
partners including China, Korea and Japan22. These three nations signed 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Chapter 1, Pur-
pose and Principles Article 1 states “the purpose of this Treaty is to 
promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among 
their peoples which would contribute to their strengths, solidarity and 
closer relations”23. The APT has become the platform for cooperation, 
reconciliation, and East Asian community building. Seen from the per-
spective of regional peace, the states have been able to use this 
platform for positive interstate relations that have developed to such 
an extent that there has been less need for deliberate efforts to avoid 
confrontations over conflictual issues‟24. It seems that ASEAN has 
taken the position that “institutions do not need to be formalized in the 
legal sense; they “may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, 
treaties and agreements, and informal practices that states and non-state 
actors accept as binding”25 In addition to this, China’s emerging lead-
ership aspirations in the context of the international community will 
also bound China to international law and a respect for their neighbor-
22  Association of South East Asian Nation. ASEAN + 3 Dialogue. 2014. Available at: 
<http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-plus-three-cooperation-2>.
23  Association of South East Asian Nation. ASEAN Charter. Available at:<http://
www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>.
24  Weissmann. “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study 
in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol . 34 (3), 
(2010), pp. 35-69.
25  Ibid .
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ing countries and their interests. China has made a commitment to 
deepen its ties and cooperation with ASEAN. However some of the 
steps as outlined by the government have not been as enthusiastically 
implemented.
Over the past few years, China has acted to maintain and 
strengthen good ties with its ASEAN partners, to the extent that 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted the desire to turn a golden decade 
of cooperation to a diamond decade of cooperation. In the Premier’s 
speech he stated “the past ten years have witnessed a golden decade 
of China-ASEAN cooperation, with bilateral trade volume increasing 
fivefold and the scale of cross-investment expanding threefold. Trade 
between China and ASEAN is expected to reach US$1 trillion by 
2020”26. Premier Li Keqiang proceeded to state that China is also will-
ing to join hands with ASEAN to advance talks of Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and discuss exchanges and in-
teractions with frameworks including Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement27. Despite these sentiments being passed in person by high 
level officials, Chinese provocative, assertive territorial stance and un-
willingness to compromise is concerning and undermining cooperation 
building efforts. China is unlikely to concede on any of its territorial 
claims as this will be perceived as an embarrassing sign of weakness.
VI. CHINESE POSITION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
China states their position is clear and consistent. The Foreign 
Minister of the People‟s Republic of China states, “China has remained 
committed to resolving the disputes through bilateral negotiations, and 
has made every effort to maintain stability and to promote regional co-
operation in the South China Sea. To resolve the disputes through ne-
gotiations by sovereign states directly concerned is also the consensus 
between China and ASEAN countries as stipulated in the Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (DOC)28.
26  Diplomatic Focus. China, ASEAN can Build a Diamond Decade. 2013. Available 
at: <http://diplomaticfocus.org/china-asean-can-build-diamond-decade/>.
27  Diplomatic Focus. China, ASEAN can Build a Diamond Decade. 2013. Available 
at: <http://diplomaticfocus.org/china-asean-can-build-diamond-decade/>.
28  Hong Lei, Spokesperson for the People‟s Republic of China. Regarding its posi-
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According the Chinese Institute for International Studies, China has 
noted the protection of its territorial integrity and the rights to exer-
cise its sovereignty as core interests. China will work with other na-
tions on an economic level through joint exploration and economic 
activities in the region. However it will not accept joint sovereignty 
of the region. “China is unlikely to agree to anything that would erode 
its strongly-asserted claims. The loss of international face would bring 
shame to China’s leadership and more particularly to the powerful mili-
tary establishment”29. Based upon this analysis, all claimants will un-
dertake vigorous diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and security in 
the region, which is contrary to Chinese behavior in the region and the 
Chinese have on numerous occasion used coercive tactics to stake its 
regional claim.
Numerous parties have raised concerns about the increasingly 
assertive China in territorial matters coupled with their response and 
attitude towards Russia’s annexation of the Southern Ukrainian island 
of Crimean and eastern areas of the country which bears similarities to 
the current South China Sea dispute. China’s position on the annexa-
tion of Ukrainian territory by the Russians is concerning and could 
forecast China’s attitude towards the possible annexation of territories 
within its claimed waters. China has declined to take steps at any level 
against the Russian Government with regards to the annexation, and it 
can therefore be assumed that the Russians would not defy a Chinese 
policy of annexation against claimed waters. At the United Nations 
Security Council meeting on the Crimean
Referendum on the 15th March 2014 in New York, China stated 
that a “political solution needs to be implemented in Ukraine to ad-
dress this issue and condemned the ongoing violence. China has always 
supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all state, which is 
the long standing fundamental position of the Chinese Government. 
The key to solving the issue is to act within law and order. China sup-
tion on the South China Sea.
29  Vatikiotis, M.South China Sea Disputes: Diplomacy Key toCalmingTroubled-
Waters, 2012. Centre for Atrategic and International Studies. Retrieved from:  
<http://cogitasia.com/south-china-sea-disputes-diplomacy- key-to-calming-trou-
bled-waters/>.
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ports a return to negotiations as a solution”30. This is however at odds 
with the international non- binding vote in which 100 nations voted 
that the referendum was illegal, politically partisan and in defiance of 
the political desires and aspiration of the Crimean population. Beijing 
however decided to abstain from this vote, not voting in support of 
Russia’s position, which would be seen as politically and internation-
ally irresponsible, however in order to maintain positive relations with 
Moscow they also opted not to condemn the vote as invalid nor dismiss 
its outcome. This is concerning, as China’s voting position does not 
disapprove of this form of territorial annexation. Since this vote, the 
Chinese have attempted at seize areas of Vietnamese waters through 
the placement of an oil rig and engaged Vietnamese ships military 
which has raised concern.
VII. CHINESE UNPREDICTABILITY
China has made clear its intention to work with ASEAN regard-
ing all aspects of state relations, however its desire to move closer to 
ASEAN nations has been undermined by the degradation of Vietnam-
ese and Philippine sovereignty. In a move the bought Sino-Vietnam-
ese relations to their lowest point, “China sent a billion-dollar floating 
oil drilling platform deep into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and 
continental shelf. It also rammed Vietnamese surveillance vessels and 
fired at them with high-powered water cannon, severely injuring several 
crew members. At the same time, the Chinese media called on China to 
teach Vietnam a lesson if it dared to protest”.31 This led to widespread 
protests throughout Vietnam and the evacuation of thousands of 
Chinese people from Vietnam. This further reiterates the seriousness of 
tensions in the region.
30  United Nations Security Council. 7138th  Meeting. Security Council Fails to 
Adopt Text Urging Member States Not to Recognize Planned 16 March Referendum 
in Ukraine‟s Crimea Region. 15 March 2014. Available
at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11319.doc.htm>.
31  China ‘sending mixed signals to ASEAN, 2014. The Straits Times. Retrieved from 
<http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/eye-the-world/story/china-sending-
mixed-signals-asean-20140513>.
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VIII.DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND 
CHINA
The Chinese have acted to economically exploit territory that is 
claimed by the Vietnamese through the attempted construction of a 
Chinese oil rig by Chinese Company HYSY 981 Drilling. The Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopted the stance that the waters in which 
the Chinese rig was operating “falls well within China’s sovereignty 
and jurisdiction”32.Hanoi dispatched forces to the region to hamper 
and prevent the construction of the rig and “government ships from 
China and Vietnam then clashed there on several occasions, bumping 
and exchanging water cannon fire as Vietnam sought to block Chinese 
drilling operations”33. At the peak of the altercation, there were 63 
Vietnamese ships “ramming the Chinese government ships for a total 
of 1,416 times”34. As a response to these actions, the Chinese Govern-
ment released a statement noting “the actions of the Vietnamese side 
were serious infringements upon China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction and grave threats to the safety of Chinese”35 It seems 
that the Vietnamese are aware of ASEAN‟s lacking capacity to protect 
Vietnam’s sovereignty against Chinese pressure and aggression. Viet-
nam has therefore reached out to nations outside the ASEAN region for 
military protection and assistance. As reported on August 5th 2014, an 
Indian Navy Ship visited Vietnam on a goodwill visit. I was retorted 
“that Indian Navy warship INS Shivalik has reached the Hai Phong 
Port in Vietnam on a three-day goodwill visit for improving inter-oper-
ability between the two navies”36.In a press release the Indian Govern-
ment said this is the operational reach and pursuit of India’s ‘Look East’ 
32  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‟s Republic of China. The Operation of 
the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position. 2014. June 
8. Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml>.
33  British Broadcasting Cooperation. Chinamoves Vietnam Dowover Oil Rig. 2014 Avail-
able at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28322355>.
34  British Broadcasting Cooperation. Chinamoves Vietnam Dowover Oil Rig. 2014 Avail-
able at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28322355>.
35  Ministry of Foreign Affair of the People‟s Republic of China. The Operation of the 
HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position. 2014. Available 
at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163264.shtml>.
36  Business Standard. Indian NavyWarshipReaches Vietnam on Goodwill Visit, 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/indian-navy-warship-
reaches-vietnam-on-goodwill-visit-114080600002_1.html>.
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policy, the Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet is on an operational deployment 
to the South China Sea and the North Western Pacific region‟37. The 
Indians have their own territorial disputes with the Chinese on the East-
ern border and the Chinese have made clear that Indian involvement 
in the region is unwanted. This has the potential to further strain 
relations. The Japanese have also sort to strengthen military ties with 
the Vietnamese to resist Chinese assertiveness.
IX. DETERIORATING SINO-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS
Pilipino-Chinese relations have been significantly damaged by this 
decade long dispute and the attempt to involve international courts 
for arbitration, a step that has not yet been taken by other parties. 
China has demanded that the matter be withdrawn from the inter-
national court of arbitration and dealt with at a bilateral level. The 
Chinese side claim that the Philippine submission “contains many 
grave errors both in fact and in law, and includes many false accusa-
tions against China. China firmly opposes this”.38The Chinese further 
rejected the Philippine Government’s Triple Step Plan to reduce ongo-
ing tensions in the region following a number of altercations between 
Chinese and Philippine Coast Guard vessels. The Chinese rejected this 
proposal on the grounds that “Beijing wouldn’t accept proposals that 
would “interrupt” ongoing conflict-resolution talks and “damage the 
common interests” of China and its Southeast Asian neighbors. China 
is ready to listen to well-intended proposals on the South China Sea 
from all parties,” Mr. Wang told reporters after meeting his Southeast 
Asian counterparts. “But these proposals should be objective, fair and 
constructive, rather than contributing to new problems or be driven by 
ulterior motives.”39
37  Ibid .
38  British Broadcasting Cooperation. Chinamoves Vietnam Dowover Oil Rig.2014 Avail-
able at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28322355>.
39  Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, China Rejects Philippine Proposal on 
South China Sea Disputes Beijing Refuses to Accept Plan, Claiming it Would 
Interrupt Ongoing Conflict-Resolution Talks, Wall Street
Journal. 9 August 2014. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/articles/china-rejects-
philippine-proposal-on-south- china-sea-disputes-1407574262>.
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According to Manila, the Triple Steps Plan reflects the South China 
Sea Code of Conduct which was implemented in 2002. The Philippine 
Foreign Minister urged “China to immediately cease “provocative” 
actions  that  contravene  the  declaration,  such  as  the  construction  of 
structures  on disputed islands”40. The Japanese have urged the Chinese 
to do the same regarding disputed islands in the region. According to the 
Philippine Foreign Minister, “China is trying to actualize their [claims] 
in advance of arbitration and the conclusion of a code of conduct”.41 The 
Chinese have criticized the Philippine Government and demanded their 
case for arbitration in international courts be withdrawn for the triple 
step plan as their “actions on the ground aren’t consistent with their 
public pronouncements”.42 This occurred in a period of heightened ten-
sions in the region as the United States and ASEAN nations criticize the 
Chinese for “taking unilateral and provocative actions to pursue claims 
in the South China Sea‟43. The Chinese Government further warned the 
Philippines over their attempt to win economic contracts with energy 
companies in the region. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
stated “the biding violated Chinese interests without the permission 
of the Chinese Government. Oil exploration done by any company or 
any country that enters China’s jurisdiction is illegal”. China urges the 
Philippines to adhere to the principal of the Declaration of the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea. According to a statement by the US 
Department of State, “The United States does not take sides on any of 
the sovereignty disputes in Asia, but insists that parties to the dispute 
do not resort or threaten the use of force to settle disputes”.44 Most na-
tions both in the region and outside, have taken a similar policy stance.
The Philippines along with allied nations have been swift and vocal 
against act of Chinese aggression and intimidation which has resulted 
in the damage of Philippine military vessels. Despite the military su-
40  Wong, Chun Han. China Rejects Philippine Proposal on South China Sea Dis-
putes. 9 August 2014. Wall Street Journal. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cles/china-rejects-philippine-proposal-on-south-china-sea- disputes-1407574262>.
41  Ibid .
42  Ibid .
43  Ibid .
44  Keck, Z. US ChallengesChina‟sNine-DashLineClaim. 2014. The Diplomat. Re-
trieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/us-challenges-chinas-nine-dash-line-
claim/>.
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periority of the Chinese, it’s is still unlikely that the Chinese launch 
an openly hostile act of military aggression against the Philippines, or 
any other nation in the South China Sea and historical conduct in the 
region supports this hypothesis. The current territorial disputes have 
been matters of contention in the South China Sea for decades, with 
a particularly sharp spike in tensions in the 90s. “At the time, military 
forces were seizing claims and a conflict between the Philippines and 
China over the Mischief Reef in 1995 stopped short of military conflict 
mainly because of the unequal power of the two nations‟.45 This sug-
gests that governments are likely to exercise restraint in the face of 
real conflict and reduce tensions.
X. THE PHILIPPINE’S CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION
The Europeans and Americans support the International Arbitration 
Case initiated by the Philippines to address this issues. Despite this 
support, the case has however been criticized by the Chinese. In 
February 2013, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines rejected and 
returned the Note Verbale and the attached Philippines‟ notification 
of arbitration and statement of claim. The notification provided to the 
Chinese Ambassador in Manila notifying the Chinese Government that 
the Philippines Government was bring the South China Sea before the 
arbitral tribunal in accordance with Article 287 and Annex VII of the 
Laws of the Sea Convention46. The Philippines Government “de-
clares that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its 
so-called “nine-dash line” is contrary to the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea and is invalid. The Philippines have also 
disregarded the Chinese historical claims to the region stating that 
decision must be based upon international law and not one state’s ver-
45  Weissmann, “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study 
in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building”, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol . 34 (3), 
(2010), pp. 35.
46  Yann-Huei Song. Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea. European 
and American Perspectives Support for International Arbitration Invited by the Philip-
pines against China. 2013 Ashgate.
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sion of history and other extraneous factors”.47 Based on the logic as 
displayed by the Chinese regarding this issue, the British, Spanish and 
Portages would have the right to claim waters far for their own shores. 
In addition to this, the Philippines is also rising Beijing’s claims for 
uninhabitable islands, submerged landmarks and Chinese harassment 
of Philippine vessels.48 Beijing has accused Manila of violating the con-
sensus in the 2002 DOC, because the declaration states that disputes 
should be solved through friendly talks and negations by sovereign 
states directly concerned. This is one of the most prominent factual 
and legal flaws as highlighted by the Chinese in the Philippines case.
XI. INDONESIAN REACTION
This issue is one of concern in Indonesia and was noted in the 2014 
Indonesian Presidential election. According to Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Marty Natelegawa, there are no Indonesian territories that are 
disputed by the Chinese. However this will no doubt become an issue 
that impacts Indonesia. European arbitration lawyers have warned the 
Indonesians against the adoption of this stance noting the ambiguity 
of China’s nine-dash line policy has the potential to violate Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity. Indonesia, as a non-claimant state, is attempting to 
mediate by calling for a special meeting on the issue on the sidelines 
of the next ASEAN leaders meeting but this head-on approach may be 
too direct for China to accept.49 China has already expresses its unwill-
ingness to deal with this issue at the ASEAN level.
It was reported on the 28th September 2014 by Indonesian’s Official 
News Agency, Antara that Indonesia had mobilized military assists to 
the Province of Riau in the northern regions of Indonesia off the coast 
of Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia’s Defense Minister Purnomo 
47  Dutton, P. A. The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and 
the South China Sea. East and South China Seas Bulletin #10. March 2013. Cen-
ter for a New American Security. Available at <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/
publications/CNAS_Bulletin_Dutton_TheSinoPhilippineMaritimeRow_0. pdf.>.
48  Ibid .
49  Vatikiotis, M.South China Sea Disputes: Diplomacy Key toCalmingTroubledWa-
ters, 2012. Centre for Atrategic and International Studies. Retrieved from: <http://cog-
itasia.com/south-china-sea-disputes-diplomacy- key-to-calming-troubled-waters/>.
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Yusgiantoro said the squadron of Apache war aircraft has been tasked to 
maintain the security and defense of the South China Sea. “The South 
China Sea is very strategic because of its large gas and oil reserves”50. 
This squadron will be further supplemented with the deployment of 
drone aircraft to the region. Indonesia notes the importance of this 
region as it borders four neighboring nations and has significant eco-
nomic importance. Trade, sea traffic and organized criminality in this 
region has also developed expeditiously, which warrants an increase in 
security spending and Indonesian military power in the region.
Despite this, during the Indonesian Presidential Election debate, 
President Elect Jokowi stated his stance on Indonesia’s role in the 
disputes of the South China Sea. To this he stated “Indonesia does 
not have any territory within the disputed area. Indonesia’s role, if 
required, must be beneficial, and provide a solution it must ensure 
that this dispute do not expand across a greater area with the capac-
ity to adversely impact Indonesia”. He further went on to say, that 
any “involvement in the disputes would be carefully considered for 
the potential to undermine Indonesian-Sino relations. Indonesia will 
play a diplomatic role in finding a solution to the disputes.  Indonesia’s 
national interests remain number one in all the issues in the South East 
Asian Region”. China encourages greater Indonesian involvement and 
Indonesia’s main concern is the maintenance of relations with China, 
however this may limit its capacity to resolve this issue. The Chinese 
may have invited the Indonesians to play a greater role due to 
their economic and political dominance and leadership in ASEAN as 
well as its close relations with the Philippines and Vietnam. Nations 
throughout the world have called on ASEAN and the Indonesians to 
play a greater role in the region.
XII. CODE OF CONDUCT
The 2002 Code of Conduct has been hailed by many, including the 
Europeans and Americans as an important step forward in addressing 
this issue and ensuring a peaceful resolution to ongoing disputes. While 
it is widely accepted that conventional war will not come to fruition, 
50  Antara News Agency, Apache untuk Jaga Laut Cina Selatan. 2014.
ASEAN’s Ambiguous Role in Resolving South China Sea Disputes
305Volume 12 Number 3 April 2015
ongoing tensions are a distraction to economic and social growth and 
development. “This is the case not only in the South China Sea but also 
in the broader East Asia region where, instead of perpetual conflict, the 
post-Cold War era has been characterized by integration and a focus on 
multilateralism and multilateral cooperation”51.The Regional Code of 
Conduct is one such example of this cooperation and will play an im-
portant role in eliminating possible distractions to ongoing development 
and growth. This Code of Conduct was announced at the 20th Summit 
in April 2012 by the 10 member states of ASEAN. At the following 
meeting of leaders in July 2012, no statement was released on the South 
China Sea which is the first time in 45 years that no statement had 
been released on the issue. This indicated possible tensions between 
ASEAN nations in addressing the issue. On the 20 July 2012, ASEAN 
did however release ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China 
Sea. This includes the following six points:
1) The full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Par-
ties in the South China Sea (2002);
2) The Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011);
3) The early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea;
4) The full respect of the universally recognized principles of Interna-
tional Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
5) The continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all 
parties; and
6) The peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universal-
ly recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).52
Despite the commitment of ASEAN to follow and implement these 
principles, this process of execution is being hindered by possible at-
51  Weissmann, “The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-ASEAN Relations: A Study 
in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building,” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol . 34 (3), 
(2010), pp. 35-69
52  Council on Foreign Relations. ASEAN‟s Six-Point Principles on the South China 
Sea, July 20, 2012. Available at:  <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/aseans-six-
point-principles-south-china-sea/p28915>.
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tempts by ASEAN to avoid the issue, and China has made clear its 
position that the issue will not be dealt with at an ASEAN level. In 
November 2012, heads of ASEAN nations met in Cambodia. However 
ASEAN efforts to implement a code of conduct were not mentioned in 
statements following the meetings. This issue was also not brought 
to the table at the 15th ASEAN-China summit of November 2012 and 
the terms eventual realization of the regional code of conduct was men-
tioned at the 18th, 19th and 20th ASEAN summits53. As previously dis-
cussed, parties outside ASEAN, especially the Chinese, have the capac-
ity influence the association’s agenda and have made clear that they 
do not welcome ASEAN involvement in dispute resolution. No further 
concrete steps were taken which possibly signals the lacking willing-
ness and incapacity of ASEAN to play an effective role as arbitrator 
while dealing with the issue.
XIII.ENSURING PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT GOING FORWARD
Despite the growing tensions in the region, the increase of military 
spending and diplomatic provocations, it still remains unlikely that a 
state of warfare will transpire in the region. ASEAN still refuses to 
deal directly with the issue through dispute resolution and negotia-
tions and its structure makes any negotiations process extremely frag-
ile and almost impossible. Despite these issues, a level of peace has 
been maintained through cooperation and a joint understanding that 
conflict would be detrimental to the interests of all states in the region. 
“Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the role of preventive diplo-
macy, peace and trust building. This has been taken up by the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific, but so far with little practical impact on policy”.54 
Despite the lacking effectiveness and its inability to resolve these dis-
putes, this is the most effective role that ASEAN can play as a major 
53  Yann-Huei Song. Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea. European 
and American Perspectives Support for International Arbitration Invited by the Philip-
pines against China. 2013 Ashgate.
54  Valencia, M. J. The East China Sea dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible 
Solutions. 2000. Asian Perspective, 31(1), 127-167. Retrieved from <http://search.
proquest.com/docview/215884000?accountid=38628>.
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actor in the region. “The elite interactions have increased the regional 
ability to prevent conflicts from arising and escalating and have thus 
been an important peace-building mechanism. Not least, they have been 
an important force for regional trust and confidence building, and for 
the development of a regional identity through East Asian community 
building‟.55 ASEAN has fostered and nurtured these ties. Despite this 
ASEAN will not adopt a joint and comprehensive policy stance with 
regards to this issue. It is clear that ASEAN does not have either the 
resources, nor the structures and institutions that are capable of re-
solving these disputes. ASEAN’s principal role is therefore the protec-
tion of peace and the building of trust.
ASEAN has attempted this in a number of forums. On the 23rd 
of April 2014, ASEAN held the 7th ASEAN China Senior Officials‟ 
Meeting (SOM) on the Implementation of the Declaration of Conduct 
(DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and the 20th ASEAN-China 
Senior Officials’ Consultation (ACSOC). In a press release following 
the conferences “The 7th ASEAN-China SOM on DOC” agreed to con-
tinue building mutual trust and practical cooperation between ASEAN 
and China in order to maintain and promote peace, stability and mari-
time security in the South China Sea. The meeting stressed the need to 
pursue the full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety, 
which includes not only project-based confidence building activities 
but also full observance of the principles and norms of conduct as laid 
down in the DOC.56 This will play an important role in developing the 
trust and goodwill between the two parties as well as reducing violent 
altercations and unfriendly diplomacy. Developing trust and coopera-
tion among nations is also important for economic reasons. The large 
natural resource reserves in the area cannot be exploited until these 
territorial disputes have been resolved, therefore there is also an eco-
nomic imperative to expedite the resolution process.
55  Weissmann, M. The South China Sea conflict and Sino-ASEAN relations: A study 
in conflict prevention and peace building. 2010. Asian Perspectives. Pro Quest.
56  ASEAN Secretariat News. ASEAN and China to Continue Building Mutual Trust 
and Cooperation, 2014. ASEAN. Retrieved from  <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-
secretariat-news/item/asean-and-china-to-continue- building-mutual-trust-and-coop-
eration>.
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XIV. CONCLUSION
ASEAN has received harsh criticism for its lacking capacity to 
formulate binding solutions to the numerous territorial disputes that 
continue to heat diplomatic relations to the point in which cooperation 
has been undermined in order to protect individual national interests. 
China’s size, economic, military and diplomatic strength has managed 
to fracture cooperation amongst ASEAN nations which has granted 
the Chinese a greater influence over the loosely bound association 
of nations. The adoption of a formal stance will be difficult as each na-
tion has its own interests to protect and further advance and ASEAN 
does not have the capacity to bind nations. This is also complicated 
by the structure of the association which allows one individual nations 
to render an ASEAN proposals invalid. This means consensus among 
ASEAN nations is nearly impossible. Sino-Philippine relations, Sino-
Vietnamese relations and internal ASEAN relations have fallen to 
their lowest point while addressing territorial issues and the economic 
exploitation of natural resources in the South China Sea. This lack of 
faith in ASEAN‟s capacity to deal with this issue is further reiterated by 
the fact that ASEAN nations are reaching out to military powers outside 
ASEAN to ensure their security interests remain protected. Indonesia 
has played an important role in implementing a code of conduct to 
maintain peace in the region and is likely to become more involved over 
the coming decades.
ASEAN‟s role will therefore be trust building and relation strength-
ening exercises as well as initiatives to develop interdependence and 
cooperation. ASEAN has been criticised for its lacking involvement 
however it has managed to maintain peace and avoid conflicts despite 
the absence of any formal peacekeeping or defence mechanism. The 
strengthening of multilateral ties, ongoing dialogue will be the most ef-
fective and important peacekeeping tool, that will be advanced through 
ASEAN, its member states and international partners. It is likely that 
economic interests will prevail and reduce the willingness of any na-
tion to become military involved and further develop cooperation to 
achieve economic prosperity and development.
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